Why Russians Support Putin and Why They Might Not – Kirillova Offers a Typology

Paul Goble

 

            Staunton, January 10 – Most analysts have treated reports that 80 percent or more Russians support Vladimir Putin and his war in Ukraine either as fraudulent, an indication of the success of government propaganda, or as an indication of where Russian society as a whole now stands.

 

But Russian journalist Kseniya Kirillova suggests that regardless of whether that figure is completely accurate, there are in fact six more or less distinct groups subsumed under it and that each has its own reasons for being there and its own vision of where Russia should be heading (cogita.ru/a.n.-alekseev/publikacii-a.n.alekseeva/kseniya-kirillova-tipologiya-rossiyan-podderzhivayuschih-rezhim-putina).

 

And because the members of these groups – and Kirillova does not attempt to suggest exactly what share any of them form in “the Putin majority” – have different positions, they can be evaluated in terms of how they are likely to behave in the future if the economic crisis in the country grows into a political one.

 

The first group, she says, are “the active ‘imperialists,’” ideologically committed to the annexationist policies of the Kremlin. These include both the ideologues of the “Russian world” and those who want to see Putin and the Russian state become more powerful at home as well as abroad.

 

The number of people in this group is not large, and their degree of ideological consolidation is sufficiently limited that “a disappointment in a specific idea will automatically lead to a sharp exodus of supporters” of this position. Those are positive factors for anyone who wants to see a change in Russia.

 

            But on the other hand, “despite their small numbers,” the members of this group constitute “the majority in the Russian media space and on the Internet,” they are concerned about ideology and thus will defend their ideas, and they will defend Putin and his regime in the event of a crisis as the best means of defending themselves.

 

            The second group are “the active conformists,” people who while not ideological are conditioned “from pragmatic and utilitarian considerations” to go along with the powers that be.  The number of such people “has turned out to be much larger than one might have expected,” Kirillova says.

 

            No fewer than 20,000 journalists are in this group for that reason, but its members also include Russian military and security types, government officials, and activists who are making a good living by pushing the Kremlin line on Ukraine or on the need to crush dissent.  And it includes many in the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy.

 

            Despite its numbers, Kirillova argues,”this group all the sameremains aminority as does any active group compared ot the general passivity of Russians.” Moreover, because it does not rest on a belief in a specific ideological position, its members can be expected to change their views with any shift in power or policy.

 

            But it is nonetheless an important resource for the Kremlin because it forms “the absolute majority of the active population of Russia” and perhaps even more because its activities up to now have “cut off its opportunity to retreat” in the future. Thus they “will defend the regime as the single guarantee of their own security.”

 

            The third category includes “the passive conformists,” who are not benefitting specifically from Putin’s line but who are used to going along with whatever the leadership says. Some of them are smart enough to reject part of what the propagandists say but not smart enough to recognize how false the total picture the latter paint in fact is.

 

            They aren’t interested in much beyond their own immediate lives and consequently won’t defend the existing regime in the event of a crisis, although many of them may feel constrained about coming out against it as long as they feel “the greatness of Russia” is at risk and that revenge is possible.

 

            The fourth includes “the typical residents,” who simply want to keep out of the way and get on with their own lives. They too are “in principle” not interested in preserving the existing regime and they are more likely than the passive conformists to be willing to protest against it if the situation its worse.

 

            But at the same time, they too will defer to the authorities and their “sacred” status far longer than is warranted, something the regime can use, and they will be more open than other groups to the argument that they should support whoever is in office because “otherwise ‘things will be even worse.’”

 

            The fifth group includes “the zombified inhabitants or passive victims of propaganda. They really get their information only from state television and they believe what they see. They are distinguished from the third and fourth groups in that they do not doubt what they are told rather than deciding that they have little interest in challenging the story line.

 

            Like those other two groups, this one is “personally not interested in the preservation of the regime,” includes people who are quite capable of criticizing the authorities when they act against their personal interests, and can evolve and mature into full-fledged citizens capable of acting on their own if they suddenly discover that what they have been told is a lie.

 

            At the same time, however, this group fears even more than the others that the future might be even worse and thus its members are inclined to support the status quo believing that Putin “despite all his shortcomings” is doing something positive in Ukraine and “saving Russia” from a West that wants to destroy the country.

 

            And the sixth group, Kirillova says, are “the active victims of propaganda.” This is a subset of the fifth and includes those who are impressed by government propaganda because it helps give them a sense of efficacy. That is especially important because Russians, as unhappy as they are with their surroundings, “constantly feel their inability to change anything in it.”

 

            Among this group, she continues, there are many who are either marginal figures of those who “in principle are accustomed to living by illusions. As a rule, they are not capable of a real defense of their illusions in the event of growing threats.” And thus the potential that under such threats, they will change their views and join the opposition is higher than many might expect.

 

            But the longer they are subject to propaganda, the more members of this group may become ideologically convinced of the rightness of Putin’s line and thus will become “subconsciously interested in the preservation of the regime” because they like “the psychological atmosphere of struggle and conspiracy theories which it is creating.”